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The Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC) aims to encourage critical debate and policy dialogue 
on the future of agriculture in Africa. The Consortium is a partnership between research-based 
organisations in Africa and the UK, with work currently focusing on Ethiopia, Kenya and Malawi.
Through stakeholder-led policy dialogues on future scenarios for agriculture, informed by field 
research, the Consortium aims to elaborate the practical and policy challenges of establishing and 
sustaining pro-poor agricultural growth in Africa, with a focus on Ethiopia, Kenya and Malawi.
Current work focuses on four core themes:
Policy processes:•	  what political, organisational or budgetary processes promote or hinder path-
ways to pro-poor, agriculture-led growth? What role should different actors, including Ministries 
of Agriculture, have in this?
Growth and social protection: •	 what are the trade-offs and complementarities between growth 
and social protection objectives?
Agricultural commercialisation: •	 what types of commercialisation of agriculture both promote 
growth and reduce poverty? What institutional and market arrangements are required?
Science, technology and innovation:•	  how can agricultural technology be made to work for the 
poor? How are technology trajectories linked to processes of agrarian/livelihood change?
 
 
The Future Agricultures Consortium is a DFID-funded agriculture research network hosted by the 
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and with membership from leading research institutions 
in Africa and Europe including: IDS, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), School of Oriental and 
African Studies (SOAS), Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy and Development (Kenya), Kenya 
Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), the Ethiopian Economic Policy Research 
Institute (EEPRI), AZ Consult (Ethiopia), and Chancellor College (Malawi).
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Can the smallholder model deliver poverty 
reduction and food security for a rapidly 
growing population in Africa?
SUMMARY
Despite the achievements of smallholders in Asia during the green revolution, there is scepticism 
that Africa’s smallholders — who dominate the farm area in most countries — can imitate this model 
and deliver agricultural growth. This paper assesses whether such pessimism is justified.
Given the high transactions costs of hiring labour of farms, diseconomies of scale can be expected 
when labour is relatively cheap and abundant compared to other factors of production: which may 
explain the survey evidence that small farms often produce more per hectare than larger farms. In 
conditions of low development with relatively cheap labour, small units may have advantages over 
larger ones.
The empirical record of performance of small and large farms in Africa is uneven and incomplete. 
Given the dominance of small farms in agriculture in many African countries, national data may be 
indicative of small farm performance. The record since the 1960s shows variable performance in 
agricultural growth through time and space, with slow growth in the 1970s followed by accelera-
tion from the early 1980s. Even more striking is the difference in the performance of Northern and 
Western Africa compared to that of other regions of the continent. But the differences are not just 
regional: there is great variation across countries. While many African countries have a disappoint-
ing record of growth, thirteen doubled or more their production in the twenty years from the early 
1980s onwards. These include countries where the bulk of output comes from small farms — Burkina 
Faso, Ghana, Niger, Mali, etc. Countries that have, or had, notable large-farm sectors such as Namibia, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe are well down the growth ranking. This proves little about scale since 
other factors are so much more important for agricultural growth, but it does show that to have an 
agriculture dominated by small farms is no obstacle to growth, and quite rapid growth at that. 
On labour productivity, either by level or rate of growth, small farming suffers in comparison to 
large-scale farming. This is to be expected: small farms tend to apply much more labour per hectare 
than large units. This creates employment, but the statistics suggest that too often this is poorly 
rewarded. 
Detailed studies and historical reviews show many instances where agricultural booms —periods in 
which substantial increases in marketed output of both food and cash crops have been seen —have 
taken place, based on small-scale farming. These can be seen or both export and food crops. An 
IFPRI survey of technical successes shows that almost all have been applied to good effect by small 
farmers.
On the other hand, there is no record of generalised success with large farms: on the contrary, there 
have been some notable failures with large farms — for example, the groundnuts scheme — often 
associated with reliance on (heavy) machinery unsuited to local soils. There are reasons other than 
history to explain why, other than for some high value enterprises and for crops that require process-
ing in large-scale plants, large farms are not common in Africa. 
For policy these debates are perhaps less important than understanding the conditions under 
which smallholder development takes place. There is broad understanding that the combination of 
creating a favourable investment climate, spending on public goods, fostering of economic institu-
tions, the presence of demand at the farm gate, and conservation of natural resources are necessary. 
The details of this in particular circumstances can, however, be elusive. But for the purposes of this 
paper, the record shows that they have been achieved at various times and places: the agenda is not 
impossible.
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Some object to the argument so far, pointing out that history is not necessarily a good guide to the 
present or future since times change. Africa today is not the same as Asia at the start of the green 
revolution. Agricultural supply chains are changing with ever more demanding conditions being 
imposed on would-be suppliers that may marginalise small farms; technical innovations for African 
conditions may be difficult to generate; environmental degradation and climate change undermine 
development efforts; HIV/AIDS takes a heavy toll in parts of Eastern and Southern Africa; and the 
kind of support to farming given by Asian governments thirty-odd years is simply unthinkable today. 
But not all change in negative: agricultural science is better equipped today to produce innovations 
than before; Asian economic growth, upward pressure on commodity prices present Africa with 
export opportunities; and biofuels may constitute a major new market for farmers. It is far from clear 
that African farmers have worse prospects than their Asian counterparts of a generation ago.
An important qualification to the debate is that smallholder development will benefit directly 
probably no more than the uppermost quartile of small farmers, those with a little more land and 
resources than their often land-poor neighbours. Surveys show clearly just how unequally land is 
distributed even within relatively egalitarian villages where there no landlords, only farming house-
holds; and the way in which most of the marketed output comes from a minority of small farms.
Does this mean, then, that even agricultural development based on small farms, however successful 
in producing more, will not reduce poverty and hunger? No, given complementary actions there 
is every reason to expect multipliers in the rural economy to translate the uneven pattern of small-
holder growth into broad-based gains. Measures to encourage the rural non-farm economy, to build 
links to cities and to provide social protection are more complementary, overlapping and synergistic, 
than competing. 
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Introduction
Despite urbanisation, Africa is still a predominantly rural continent, with more than 60% of 906M 
persons living in rural areas in 2005; where most households live in villages and farm, even if they 
undertake other activities for their livelihoods as well. The bulk of farms are both physically small — 
of less than two hectares of good arable land, or its equivalent — and operated at the household 
level using for the most part using family labour. 
There are around 33M small farms — roughly, those with less than two hectares — in Africa, rep-
resenting 80% of all farms, with an average size of 1.6 ha. There are varying reports of the share of 
production that comes from small farms, some going as high as 90%. Table 1 shows the numbers 
and shares of farms and area for selected countries. (All data reported in Nagayets 2005)
Table 1: Africa, selected countries, small farms
Year No small farms Share of farms, % Share area tilled, %
Ethiopia 2001–02 9,374,455 87 60
Nigeria 2000 6,252,235 74
DR Congo 1990 4,351,000 97 86
Tanzania 1994-95 2,904,241 75
Egypt 1990 2,616,991 90 49
Uganda 1991 73 27
Source: Nagayets 2005
Debates over the relative efficiency of small and large farms are longstanding (see Hazell et al. 2007). 
Notwithstanding that the successes of the green revolution in Asia, and above all in China, were 
achieved largely by smallholders, scepticism about the ability of Africa’s small farmers to repeat this 
experience is widespread. A recent example is an essay by Professor Collier (2008) that argues that 
to get agriculture in Africa  moving, large commercial farms may be a better option than smallholder 
development.
Why the pessimism over the prospects for African smallholder development? Amongst the reasons 
mentioned are that Africa’s physical geography — soils, climate, hydrology — means that the tech-
nical challenge of breeding higher-yielding crop varieties is more daunting and that the possibilities 
for irrigation are less; that lower world food prices — as seen before the 2007/08 price spike — made 
food crop intensification uneconomic; and that governments were unprepared or unable to con-
template providing the extensive state support to kick-start a green revolution in the way that Asian 
governments had in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Furthermore, the of disappointing record of African agricultural development — in many, but not 
all, countries — over the last 30 or more years not surprisingly invited doubts about the ability of 
the predominantly smallholder structure of farming across the continent to deliver agricultural 
development. This essay will argue that the disappointments, although real, are far from universal 
and that a more detailed examination of the record of African farming show more success than is 
commonly portrayed. 
The paper is made up by the following sections. First, the general debate over the relative merits of 
small and large farms is set out, looking particularly at the relative efficiency of small and large farms. 
Following this the empirical record of small and large farms in Africa, such as it is, is reviewed.  Third, 
the conditions under which smallholder development is possible are considered. Qualifications to 
the main argument are presented in the fourth section, before concluding. 
The title of this paper suggests that it will deal with the relation between agricultural development, 
poverty and food security. That will be attempted only to a limited extent: the main focus here is on 
the question of whether smallholder development can deliver agricultural growth. Whether such 
growth, and its pattern, reduces poverty and improves food security is a much wider question; one 
that will only be touched upon here. This reticence arises mainly from the need to devote space first 
and foremost to addressing the debate over the feasibility of smallholder development in Africa 
since this is the main point in contention. Relatively few observers doubt that agricultural develop-
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ment is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for poverty reduction and food security in Africa: and 
certainly not after the shock of the 2007/08 price spike that undermined the argument that food 
security could readily be achieved through food imports. (Indeed, if anything, mainstream thinking 
about Africa agriculture — as represented by the African Union’s Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme [CAADP] and the donors and private foundations that support this initia-
tive — is only too convinced that this is the case.) Moreover, the case for agricultural development 
as being an effective way for low income and largely agrarian countries  — as applies across most of 
Africa — to reduce poverty has been made cogently in the 2008 World Development Report (World 
Bank 2007). 
This is to not to argue that the links from agricultural development to poverty reduction and better 
nutrition are automatic: they are not. But to widen the discussion to consider these fully would make 
this a far longer paper than is appropriate. This issue will be revisited briefly in the conclusions. 
Small and large farms: relative efficiency
Surveys of farms of different sizes in developing countries frequently show small farms producing 
more per hectare than large farms, with an inverse relationship between farm size and production 
per unit of land (Cornia 1985, Eastwood & Lipton 2004) — see Figures in Annex.1  The explanation 
usually put forward is that there are few economies of scale in farming, and indeed that there may be 
diseconomies of scale once the farm grows larger than can be managed and operated by household 
labour. These diseconomies arise from labour use: household labour can be readily available, flex-
ible in time and effort to suit the demands of the farm that can be difficult to predict exactly — for 
example, planting times, control of pests and diseases, harvesting. Above all, household labour is 
usually self-supervising and motivated to carry out operations diligently. In contrast, larger farms 
depending largely on hired labour incur (transactions) costs in recruiting and supervising labour. 
Hence small farms usually apply more labour per hectare than larger farms and consequently pro-
duce more — albeit with lower marginal returns to labour.2 
Diseconomies of scale in farm production are therefore likely to be stronger when labour is a major 
input to production, as applies when labour is relatively cheap and capital relatively costly — the 
case in much of Africa.3   
Other advantages of small scale in farming that are mentioned are farmers operating small plots 
may have considerable detailed knowledge of their soils, topography, drainage, etc. allowing them 
to work the land appropriately.  Small farms may be better able to resist temporary slumps in prices, 
since household labour may be prepared to accept lower returns to their labour at times when a 
commercial farmer would simply go bankrupt. 
Small farms producing subsistence crops also have advantages in circumstances when obtaining 
staples from the market may involve significant costs and risks; which is still the case in much of rural 
Africa.
 
In transactions off the farm, however, countervailing economies of scale apply in procuring inputs, 
marketing output, obtaining credit and other financial services, in obtaining information on mar-
kets and technical issues, in meeting standards and certifying production, and in transacting with 
large-scale buyers from processors and supermarket chains with their exacting demands for quality, 
timeliness and bulk deliveries. Poulton et al. (2005) summarise these as shown in Table 2. 
1 The evidence for the inverse relationship is not undisputed. There are difficulties with definitions of farm size and 
with measures of productivity. However where studies have tried to refine definitions of size and productivity by, for example, 
looking at size in terms of land area per worker and adjusting for land quality, the relationship has often been strengthened 
(Lipton, 1993).
2 This persists owing to factor market failures, since it would be better if smallholders hired out some of their labour to 
larger farms, or alternatively if the larger units rented out land to small farmers; either of which would be expected to equalise 
returns to land and labour.
3 Indeed, the transaction costs of hired labour seem to be so high that across the world for most lines of agriculture 
— some poultry, pigs, fruit, vegetables, flowers and fish excluded — farms are typically operated at the household scale, with 
hired labour used only for peak-season operations.
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Table 2: Transaction Cost Advantages of Small and Large Farms
Small farms Large farms
Unskilled labour supervision, motivation, etc √
Local knowledge √
Food purchases & risk (subsistence) √
Skilled labour √
Market knowledge √
Technical knowledge √
Inputs purchase √
Finance & capital √
Land √
Output markets √
Product traceability and quality assurance √
Risk management √
Source: Poulton et al. 2005
In some circumstances high transaction costs for credit can stymie production on very small farms, 
as Dorward (1999) argues when examining farm survey data for Malawi from the 1980s. In this case, 
production per hectare rose with size up to two hectares; apparently since those with smaller hold-
ings were so starved of cash to buy inputs that they had to work on neighbouring farms in the early 
part of the crop season to raise funds and so neglected their own holdings. 
In sum, when labour costs are important, and when at least part of production is for subsistence, 
small farms may have significant advantages over larger units. Conversely, once agriculture becomes 
more intensive in transactions beyond the farm gate, larger farms may have the advantage.  It should 
not be expected that the advantages of scale are immutable: they can be expected to change with 
development. But for much of rural Africa, with relatively low levels of development, there are thus 
reasons to expect small farms to be as efficient in land uses, or more so, than larger farms.
The record of agriculture at small and large scale
in Africa
Evidence, albeit incomplete, imperfect and even indirect, to examine the records of small and large 
farm performance in Africa can be found at both national and district level.
Insights from national data
Nationally, there are few if any countries in Africa that record estimates of farm output by farm size. 
That said, there are countries where small family farms dominate agriculture to the point that national 
statistics are tantamount to a record of small farm performance. Indeed there are few countries in 
Africa where large commercial farms, estates and plantations occupy more than a small fraction 
of the land — South Africa and Namibia being prominent exceptions. Thus, with a few countries 
excepted, examining the record of agricultural growth across Africa would largely reflect the ability 
of small farmers to increase production; while looking at labour productivity would indicate the 
ability of the sector to contribute to incomes, poverty reduction and to food security. 
The record of agricultural growth since the early 1960s is not good for Africa as a whole. By 2003/05, 
the continent as whole was producing just under three times more than it did in 1961/63: less than 
the rate of population growth, so that per capita production had fallen, albeit marginally.4  But this 
miserable statistic hides important variations through time and space. Agricultural growth slumped 
in the 1970s across the continent, but in most regions and countries that was followed by recovery 
and a marked acceleration of agricultural growth in the early 1980s. Hence the record for 1981/83 
to 2003/05 shows a continental increase that almost doubles production, outstripping population 
growth in that period by 10%. 
Spatial variations are even more striking, as Figure 1 shows. The continental average is comprised of 
highly variable performances across regions, with Northern and Western Africa doing far better than 
4 Computed from FAOSTAT data on Gross PIN for agriculture, taking three year moving averages to reduce the effect of 
annual fluctuations.
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the rest of the continent; and in these two cases, the acceleration since the early 1980s is particularly 
pronounced.5  In both of these regions, production per capita has been raised by more than 40% 
between 1981/83 and 2003/05. The performance of these two regions in raising agricultural output 
is, surprisingly, the equal of Asia during the green revolution.6  
Figure 1: Growth of agricultural production, Africa and its regions, 1961/63 to 2003/05
Source: FAOSTAT, gross PIN, taking three-year moving averages and basing the index to 1961/63.
A more detailed examination of the record at country level shows considerable variation between 
countries, including within the regions. Even in regions that have performed poorly, there are some 
countries that have done quite well in raising agricultural production. Figure 2 shows the agricultural 
growth performance over the last twenty years for the individual countries of Africa. The range of 
performance is wide. Thirteen countries more than doubled production, the equivalent of growth 
at 3.5% a year — a rate that comfortably outstrips even rapid population growth. On the other hand, 
there is a long tail of less impressive and frankly disappointing performances. 
5 Why did agriculture in these two regions see such a pronounced increase in growth from the early 1980s, and why 
did this not happen in other parts of Africa? If there is a formal study that addresses this question, I do not know it. Of the fac-
tors that change in the early 1980s there is a marked reduction in negative protection and that plausibly may have stimulate 
farming. Western Africa may differ from Eastern and Southern Africa in that there were fewer parastatals organising agriculture 
that were wound up, privatised or otherwise cut back in the era of structural adjustment; and some of those that did exist, such 
as the cotton companies of francophone West Africa were left largely intact.
6 The comparison is this: the increase in value of agricultural output for Northern and Western Africa between 1981/83 
and 2001/03; set against that for Eastern, Southern and South-Eastern Asia for 1971/73 to 1991/93, the earlier period reflecting 
that the green revolution began in Asia in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The multiple in (constant) values of production are as 
follows:
1971/73 to 1991/93 1981/83 to 2001/03
Northern Africa 2.05
Western Africa 2.43
Eastern Asia 2.12
Southern Asia 1.90
South Eastern Asia 2.09
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Figure 2: Growth of agricultural output in Africa, 1983/85 to 2003/05
Figure 2: Growth of agricultural output in Africa, 1983/85 to 2003/05
Source: FAOSTAT data, Gross agricultural PIN, three-year moving averages. Ethiopia and Eritrea combined to allow 
record to extend before 1991.
 
Now, what do these statistics suggest about smallholder performance? Simply this: amongst the 
higher performing countries are several where the bulk of output comes from small farms — Ghana, 
Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, etc. There is another observation: those countries that have, or have had, 
notable large-farm sectors — Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe — are well down the growth rank-
ing; and others with smaller but significant large farm sectors such as Kenya and Zambia are not 
amongst the fastest growing agricultures. 
Of course, scale of farming is far from being the main factor affecting growth; so this is hardly strong 
proof of the efficacy of small farms in Africa. Turned around, however, the argument is more compel-
ling: those who believe that small farms cannot be the basis for a rapidly growing agriculture have to 
explain why countries such as Ghana with its many small family farms has seen growth over the last 
twenty or so years that is the equal of that seen under the much-vaunted Asian green revolutions. 
Perhaps Ghana’s agriculture would have grown even more quickly had the units been larger, but in 
the absence of evidence from a country where farming is largely carried out on large scale doing 
better than Ghana, that would be hard to argue.7  
What do the national statistics suggest about labour productivity? Figure 3 shows statistics for the 
level of labour productivity in Africa. Labour productivity is low, at US$580 per person employed 
overall, but with marked differences across countries. Only seven countries achieve an average 
higher than US$1,000 per worker. Countries with significant large farm sectors are prominent: South 
Africa, Mauritius and Swaziland. The distribution of productivity has a long tail of very low indicators: 
almost half the countries have estimated average productivity of under US$350.8  
Growth of labour productivity since the early 1960s is equally variable. Five countries have more 
than tripled labour productivity in the intervening four decades, and another seven have at least 
doubled it. At the other end of the distribution, eighteen countries have actually seen labour pro-
ductivity fall.
7 Africa does not have many countries where large farms are prominent so perhaps this comparison is unfair. So how 
does Ghana compare to a country outside of Africa where large farms are important, such as Brazil? Value of production in 
Brazil rose by 2.15 times between 1983/85 and 2003/05, whereas it rose by 2.87 times for Ghana. All told, nine African countries 
achieved more growth of production than Brazil in this period.
8 Levels may be low, but the comparison with some Asian countries is instructive. The equivalent figures for China, 
India and Indonesia are US$725, US$560, and US$670. India’s level is thus below the Africa average, and the levels seen for 
Northern and Western Africa.
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Figure 3: Labour productivity in agriculture, Africa, 2003/05, US$ per worker
Source: FAOSTAT data for gross agricultural production value divided by the estimated economically active 
population in agriculture, using three-year moving averages
Figure 4: Growth of labour productivity in agriculture, Africa, 1961/63 to 2003/05
Source: as for Figure 3
What may be inferred by small farm labour productivity from this? In many African countries where 
small farms dominate labour productivity in agriculture is painfully low: insufficient to allow peo-
ple to escape poverty.9  Yet there are great variations. Although most of the higher performers are 
9 Assuming that each worker in farming has to support one dependant child or old person, then to escape dollar-a-day 
poverty average production per worker would need to reach US$730 at very least, given that these are gross estimates with no 
allowance for any cash costs of farming. The unknown here is what proportion of those counted in the agricultural labour force 
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countries with substantial large farm sectors, not all are. Whilst those countries showing the greatest 
improvements in labour returns include many of the countries with substantial large farm sectors, 
there are also some where small farms dominate, such as Burkina Faso. 
On labour productivity, either by level or rate of growth, small farming suffers in comparison to 
large-scale farming. This is to be expected: small farms tend to apply much more labour per hectare 
than large units. This creates employment, but the statistics suggest that too often this is poorly 
rewarded. 
Smaller-scale studies and other reports
Detailed studies and historical reviews show many instances where agricultural booms —periods in 
which substantial increases in marketed output of both food and cash crops have been seen —have 
taken place, based on small-scale farming. During the colonial era, export crop production in West 
Africa came almost entirely from small farms — groundnuts in Senegal and the Gambia, cocoa in 
Côte d‘Ivoire and Ghana, oil palm in southern Nigeria. In the second half of the twentieth century 
booms were seen with the small-scale production of export crops such as tea and coffee in Kenya, 
and in cotton in the francophone countries of the West African guinea savannah and in Zimbabwe 
(Poulton et al. 2004). 
There have also been growth spurts based on producing food for domestic markets: hybrid maize 
in Zimbabwe in the first half of the 1980s (Eicher 1995), in Tanzania and Zambia in the 1980s are ex-
amples where small farm production has been organised by state agencies. Smaller-scale booms in 
marketed food crops include rice in the inland delta of the Niger (Diarra et al. 1999), open-pollinated 
varieties of maize in the middle belt of Nigeria (Smith et al. 1993), horticultural exports from Kenya 
(Minot & Ngigi 2003), and peri-urban production of dairy, fruit and vegetables for the city of Kano 
(Mortimore 1993). 
Not all of these booms have been sustained. On the contrary, they have often been sensitive to 
prevailing prices, often linked to world market prices, as well as to state support and organisation.  
IFPRI has documented successes in African agriculture, using an survey of specialists, to identify 
cases where  there had been a ‘a significant, durable change in agriculture resulting in an increase in 
agriculturally derived aggregate income, together with reduced poverty and/or improved environ-
mental quality.’ (Haggblade et al. 2003, 10; see also Gabre-Madhin & Haggblade 2001)  Most of the 
experiences captured concern small farmers and herders benefitting from technical advances. These 
include hybrid maize varieties in Zimbabwe, Kenya and open-pollinated maize in West Africa; use 
of improved bananas in East Africa; horticulture and fruit produced by smallholders on contract in 
Kenya; cassava resistant to pests and diseases associated with large increases in cassava production 
in West Africa, and in parts of south-eastern Africa; cotton in West Africa; and smallholder dairying 
in Kenya. 
These accounts of success contain two strong messages for this paper. One is that almost all the 
technical advances described have been applied by small farmers to good effect: in no case have 
the innovations been adopted by larger-scale farms solely or disproportionately10,  nor is there any 
suggestion in these accounts that measures to consolidate holdings might be critical to success. 
The other is that some of the successes were not sustained, the clearest case being that of hybrid 
maize in Southern and Eastern Africa where use has stagnated and declined as support in the form 
of subsidies to inputs, transport and credit have been reduced or withdrawn. 
The case made is that small farms, under certain conditions, can increase their production signifi-
cantly. But that does not mean that larger-scale farms might not be even more effective in increasing 
output, improving efficiency and generally contributing to development. So what of experiences 
with large farms in Africa?  Analysis of large farm experiences is, however, relatively scant. 
work full time, and how many have other activities that generate income.
10 The exception may the case of hybrid maize in Zimbabwe that initially was used mainly by the large-scale com-
mercial farms. But this imbalance was redressed in large degree in the 1980s when the government through the GMB made it 
possible for smallholders in the communal areas to use the seeds.
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Historically there have been several instances when great faith has been placed in the potential of 
large farms, using the latest technology, to stimulate agriculture. One of the best known, and old-
est, of these was the Groundnuts Scheme. Planned in 1947, it was to operate in Tanganyika, Kenya, 
Northern Rhodesia on 1.3M hectares to produce vegetable oil for export back to the UK. By 1949 
costs had risen from £26M to £36M, less than 100,000 hectares were cleared, fewer nuts had been 
harvested than expected, and the scheme was abandoned. The scheme relied on machinery that 
was difficult to get to the sites, where it suffered breakdowns that were difficult to repair in the bush. 
Subsequent attempts to use untried prototype machinery failed for lack of testing. In any case, the 
soils and conditions were unsuited to large-scale machine farming. (Johnson & Ruttan 1994)
In 1951 in Ghana, then the Gold Coast, the state set up a company to farm 12,000 ha at Gonja in the 
northern savannah using machinery. This soon failed, with only a small part of the area cultivated 
as the machinery could not be maintained, soils were compacted, and the topsoil eroded by the 
machines. Subsequent efforts in the late 1950s and 1960s to farm in the savannah on a large scale 
also failed.  (Eicher & Baker 1982, Frimpong-Ansah 1991)
In 1971 Bud Antle, a California-based multinational, began to farm vegetables for air export from 
Senegal using two different modalities: a plantation, and contracting from local small farmers. The 
plantation, some 450 hectares large, was located only 38km from Dakar and used drip irrigation 
to produce melons, green beans, peppers and tomatoes. But the scheme ran into difficulties: soils 
were easily eroded by the large machines used, the machinery was costly to maintain, and prices in 
European markets were not always remunerative. By 1976 the operations were losing money and 
the state bought into the scheme, nationalising it. This lasted until 1979 when continuing techni-
cal problems and financial loses led to the operation being closed down. (Chasm 1983, Macintosh 
1989)
In these cases technical ignorance is prominent, outsiders assuming that techniques deployed to 
good effect elsewhere will work in rural Africa. The ravages of heavy machinery on fragile soils and 
the difficulties of operating and maintaining machinery, with its demand for all-too-scarce skilled 
drivers and mechanics, have led to reduced yields and heavy operating costs. 
These, however, are not the only problems that large farms encounter. Being formal companies they 
are often expected to comply with regulations that are rarely if ever applied to small farms: payment 
of legal minimum wages, provision of housing, education and health care to hired workers and their 
families, and taxation. In addition, being highly visible formal enterprises in rural areas they can be 
targets for informal payments to officials unusually anxious to check that the company is complying 
with rules, as well as for thieves looking to pilfer stores. All told, operating a large farm can be a costly 
business, running up spending that no small farm has to meet. (Paul Wagstaff, 2009, contribution to 
email conference)
This is not to argue that all large farms fail technically or operate at high cost in Africa. There are 
examples of large-scale farming that works well. The point is rather that large-scale farming is not 
always technically or financially the better option. While this may seem obvious, the tendency for 
unjustified optimism that big means better in farming remains unabated, even in countries with 
a record of failures. Ghana under President Kufuor is a case in point. Notwithstanding the rapid 
growth of agricultural production seen in the country since the early 1980s, achieved almost entirely 
by small farmers, and the well-known failures of large farms promoted by the late colonial and Nkru-
mah governments, ministers were seduced by the vision of modern, large-scale farms on the plains 
of Brong-Ahafo producing a rapid spurt to agricultural growth. Meanwhile across Africa since early 
2008 all kinds of schemes have been announced by foreign companies to acquire land and farm 
on a large-scale for export back to the Gulf and East Asia to counter rising world commodity prices. 
Once again, it seems, outsiders discount the challenges of farming in Africa and assume that given 
technology and scale all will be well. History suggests otherwise.11  
It is thus not surprising that large-scale farming in Africa, outside of the settler economies of South-
ern Africa, is largely confined to high-value and specialist ventures such as fruit, vegetables, flowers, 
intensive pigs and poultry; and where local processing plants, often fairly large-scale, are necessary 
for crops such as sisal, sugar, tea, rubber and coffee. These are cases where large capital investments 
11 It is a working assumption that successful large-scale farms in the Southern Africa economies were not an overnight 
success, and that the settlers leaned how to farm Africa through trial and error, adapting their imported techniques (and in-
deed some crops and animals) to local conditions.
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are necessary, or where industrial organisation of production generates physical productivity that 
cannot be achieved on small units. 
Conditions for smallholder development
 
The record shows that smallholder development has delivered agricultural growth in various places 
and at various times, and that growth is not always sustained. What, then, are the conditions under 
which smallholder development is possible? These are well-known. They include:
A favourable investment climate for farming. Critical here is a level playing field , that is that 1. 
farmers can buy inputs, access finance and sell their produce on something like neutral terms in 
which they are not exorbitantly taxed by domestic policy, albeit  implicitly, or having to compete 
with dumped food imports, or exporting to markets where prices have been depressed by the 
policies of OECD countries. A comparison of agricultural growth in Africa between the 1970s 
and 1980s, the former decade one of heavy negative protection of many farm sectors that eased 
during the 1980s, shows just how important negative protection can be.12  It also implies that 
farmers can trade with relatively low transaction costs and are not exploited by agencies with 
monopoly power.
Investment in public goods that support agriculture, most notably agricultural research and 2. 
extension, rural roads, education, health care, and , in some cases, irrigation and power supplies. 
It is probably not so much the amount that is spent by governments on agriculture, so much as 
on what is funded that counts: returns to spending on public goods seem to be high, while those 
to private goods may be lower (Fan & Rao 2003). 
Developing economic institutions to allocate and protect property rights, to facilitate trading, to 3. 
reduce risk and to allow collective action. This is a challenging agenda: in the absence of effec-
tive institutions market failures arise that ultimately prevent investment and deter innovation 
and initiative. 
These first three elements might be seen as the public agenda.13  In addition to which there is an-
other condition: 
The existence of demand that is transmitted effectively to the farm gate. Reviewing studies of 4. 
agricultural development at village and district level in the 1970s and 1980s, the single main 
factor that stimulated spurts in agricultural growth appeared to be demand felt at the farm gate. 
(Wiggins 1995, 2000) That demand arose variously from urban growth domestically, from linking 
farmers to these markets by better roads; or from parastatals offering farmers in remote areas 
pan-territorial prices that discounted the cost of transport. 
To these may be added a fifth condition:
That farmers conserve their land, water and other natural resources so that physical production 5. 
can be sustained. 
It easy enough to specify these conditions, but the record of disappointments in African agriculture 
over the last thirty or more years shows that meeting them is no simple exercise. Problems arise in 
low income countries where public resources are limited and the range of apparently necessary 
investments is wide, exceeding any imaginable budget. In such cases, there are difficult strategic 
decisions to be made about the combination and sequences of policy and investments to follow; 
for which there is relatively little guidance in the literature. But matters have sometimes been made 
worse by misguided policy and poor governance.14  
Much of the literature on African agricultural development explores these conditions: how they 
apply in different circumstances — including the extent to which farmers are close or remote from 
12 The argument was made powerfully by Krueger, Schiff & Valdés (1991). Most of the negative protection seen in the 
1970s was indirect: the result of overvalued exchange rates and protection of domestic manufacturing.
13 Poulton et al. 2006 in reviewing commercial farming in Africa summarise these conditions as:
The enabling environment consists of macro-economic stability  exchange rates, inflation; functioning basic infrastructure, 
effective commercial banking, and an investment climate with secure property rights and predictable and low taxation. Not 
only this, but governments need to reinvest their tax take  in better physical infrastructure, in research.
14 The extent to which the problems of African agriculture can be put down to lack of resources for investment, or to 
poor governance, is highly controversial, with strong views held by either side.
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the market, the quality and quantity of natural resources they can use, and population density (see, 
for example, Snrech 1995, Wood et al. 1999); and how they can best be met. This is not the place to 
revisit these arguments: for this paper it is sufficient to note that smallholder development requires 
certain conditions, and that — demanding as they may be — history suggests that they have been 
sufficiently met at various times and places for vigorous agricultural growth to occur.
A frequent objection and a clarification
A frequent objection to arguments for small farm development in Africa based on history is that 
times have changed, and what might once have been possible no longer is. Ellis (2005) argues that
 ‘Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 21st century is not Asia in the 1970s, and this needs to be well 
understood since otherwise invidious and unhelpful comparisons are made concerning the 
ability of SSA to replicate the Asian experience.’ (1)
Amongst the factors seen as changing the possibilities for African smallholder development, espe-
cially in comparison to the conditions seen in Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, are:
Changes in supply chains with increasing organisation of agricultural and food marketing •	
by supermarket chains, resulting in demand for bulk deliveries of standardised produce with 
stringent quality criteria, sometimes with certification of production conditions to boot, to 
strict timetables. These could marginalise small farmers who, it is feared, cannot produce to 
such standards, giving a decisive advantage to large units, and leaving small farmers with 
access only to markets where lower prices apply to second-best produce;
The difficulties of producing technical innovations for the diverse, rainfed ecologies of much •	
of Africa, in contrast to producing improved seeds for the irrigated lands of Asia. To this may 
be added the increasingly private nature of agricultural research with correspondingly fewer 
incentives to produce innovations for small, and poor, farmers;
The challenges of environmental degradation, water scarcity — and an associated paucity •	
of opportunities to irrigate, and climate change. Some see Africa as suffering badly from soil 
erosion and degradation;
That the kind of support to farmers seen in Asia in the past, particularly subsidies on fertiliser, •	
irrigation water and rural power, is unthinkable today; 
The impact of HIV/AIDS on farming that in parts of Southern and Eastern Africa deprives af-•	
fected households of labour and capital; and, until last year,
The long-term decline in agricultural commodity prices that reduced the profitability of farm-•	
ing — and, by making imports ever cheaper, reduced the value of producing food domesti-
cally and thereby made arguments for self-sufficiency less compelling. 
Against these changes can be set others that may imply equally good or better prospects for African 
agriculture and its smallholders, thus:
Technically, advances in biotechnology may make it easier to produce innovations suited •	
to African conditions. During the last two decades the spread of improved cassava and the 
generation of the new rice for Africa strains (NERICA) are two promising developments with 
widespread applicability for farmers;
Rapid economic growth in Asia means that some countries are now importing some com-•	
modities, such as soy beans and palm oil, on a very large scale. So far that demand has been 
met by production from South America and South-Eastern Asia, but Africa could be a supplier 
as well.15  The recent price shock has awakened interest in Africa as an exporter of food to 
Asia and the Near East. For those parts of Africa with underused land, as seen in the guinea 
savannah, and especially those along the Indian Ocean seaboard, there is the potential to 
produce and export, thereby relieving the constraint of limited local demand for additional 
production; and,
The surge in production of biofuels seen when oil prices started to rise from 2006 onwards •	
makes clear the potential for producing biofuels in Africa, and above in landlocked countries 
with spare land, to replace increasingly cost fuel imports. Across Africa studies are being car-
ried out to assess this potential. If the economics are really as good as preliminary assessments 
suggest, then a major new opportunity exists for farmers. 
15 The planned acquisition of land in Madagascar by Korea’s Daewoo was partly intended to produce palm oil.
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Weighing the balance of these different factors is more a matter of judgment than calculation. Those 
who argue that changed circumstances make former options inapplicable, need to bear in mind 
how quickly some circumstances can change, as seen most notably with concerns over the appar-
ently inexorable decline of commodity prices that have evaporated in the last eighteen months. 
But perhaps more important is that policy-makers need to be considering how to minimise the 
disadvantages and maximising the pluses. How much do the above factors affect smallholders as 
opposed to large farms? The clearest case is that of changing supply chains: if smallholder develop-
ment is to achieve its potential, then finding effective ways to minimise transaction costs and allow 
small farmers to supply the emerging chains will be critical. Similarly, market failures in access to 
finance and inputs are likely to be more severe for small than large farms. It is not surprising, then, 
that some of the most energetic debates in the last few years in Africa have turned on how to ensure 
that small farmers can obtain fertiliser. 
An important clarification in the debate concerns the nature of small farms. To some extent debates 
are obscured by unstated assumptions about the small farms that are in contention: is the debate 
about farms with the equivalent of two or three hectares of reasonable arable land, or is it about the 
land hungry who have access to plots of one hectare or less? 
Recent surveys in Eastern and Southern Africa (Jayne et al. 2005), see Figure 5, show that generally 
only the top quarter of farmers have two or more hectares: often 50% or more have less than one 
hectare, and the bottom quarter have half a hectare or less. Concern over the prospects for very 
small, perhaps marginal, farms are thus highly pertinent. 
Figure 5: Land distribution amongst small farmers in Eastern & Southern Africa, late 
1990s. Average land sizes for farmers by quartiles 
Source: derived from Jayne et al. 2005 reporting the results of surveys of small farmer communities carried out in 
the 1990s
Moreover, surveys in Africa that report the size of farms marketing produce often show that the bulk 
of marketed output from small farms comes from those that are towards the upper part of the range. 
For the same set of surveys, the value of marketed output by landholding quartile appears in Figure 
6. Sales of grain in these five countries come from 20–50% of the smallholders in a normal year, and 
even then there is marked disparity between a very small group of relatively large and well-equipped 
smallholder farmers with 4 to 20 hectares of land, usually in the most favourable agro-ecological 
areas (about 1– 4% of the total rural farm population), accounting for 50% of the marketed output 
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from smallholdings who sell between 5 and 50 tons of maize per farm in a given year, on the one 
hand; and a much larger group of smallholder farms (20–30% of the farm population) selling much 
smaller quantities of grain, between 0.1 and 5 tons per farm, on the other. This leaves 50–70% of 
rural households who are buyers of staple grains. (Jayne et al. 2005) Similarly, Scoones et. al. (1996) 
write that in Chivi, southern Zimbabwe, an area of small farms on communal areas, fully 75% of 
marketed farm output in the early 1990s came from just 25% of farms.
Figure 6: Value of marketed output, US$/household, amongst small farmers in Eastern & 
Southern Africa, late 1990s, by landholding quartile
Source: derived from Jayne et al. 2005 reporting the results of surveys of small farmer communities carried out in 
the 1990s
It is clear that there is considerable differentiation amongst small farms. Those who advocate the 
potential of small farm development need to recognise that most of the increased production, and 
hence increased earnings will accrue to only a minority of small farms. The implications of this will 
be taken up in the next, concluding section.
Conclusions
This paper argues that small farmers in Africa have a record of agricultural growth that suggests 
that, yes, more farm output can be achieved largely through smallholder development — just as 
has been the case for the Asian green revolutions. The recent history of African agricultural develop-
ment is highly uneven across countries, and very probably equally so between regions within them. 
The disappointments that have led some to pessimistic assessments of the continent’s prospects 
are real. But the same unevenness includes successes that are not always recognised. The impli-
cation seems clear: there are no specifically African disadvantages. If, for example, Burkina Faso, a 
small, landlocked country in the Sahel with at best modest natural resources, can raise its grain 
output — coming very largely from small farms — from the early 1960s by virtually the same margin 
as Vietnamese rice output16,  then surely most other countries in Africa can similarly develop their 
agriculture. 
Even if in general terms the elements for success are well known, since the detail is elusive, it is not 
necessarily straightforward to stimulate smallholder agricultural development. The challenges can 
16 Against a base of 1961/63, the index for the five-year average 2001/05 shows 367 for Vietnamese rice, and 369 for 
Burkina Faso grains. Over these four decades Vietnam registers one of strongest increases in grain production in Asia with 
Indonesia being amongst one of the few major nations outperforming it. 
[In 1961 Burkina produced 716k tonnes of grains: by 2004 the figure was estimated at 2.9M tonnes, according to FAOSTAT.]
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be quite stiff in some cases. This, however, should not cause the effort to be abandoned in favour 
of untested alternatives, such as trying to create and support large farms, that face many if not all 
of the same issues. Most of the agenda for small farm development is common to any form of agri-
cultural development, and some of it applies to all economic development; so special and unusual 
resources are not required. On the contrary, history shows examples where modest investments of 
public spending in a reasonably favourable policy context leads to strong response, in effort, in-
novation and investment by small farmers themselves — and those they work with in supply chains, 
such as traders. 
A belief in the possibilities of agricultural development based on small farms, however, does not 
necessarily or probably mean that all small farmers will participate in growth to the same degree. On 
the contrary, it is likely that it will be minority of small farms that see the bulk of added production 
and sales. 
This brings the argument back to the original question posed: that of smallholder agricultural de-
velopment and the ultimate goals of poverty reduction and food security. If much of the growth 
takes place on relatively few (small) farms, does this mean limited impacts on poverty? The answer 
is no, not necessarily. Given the right kind of complementary actions, benefits can be spread more 
widely.
Cross-country econometrics show strong associations between agricultural development and pov-
erty reduction, an association that tends to be stronger for Africa than elsewhere. For example, Irz 
et al. (2001) estimate that for every 10% increase in farm yields, there has been a 7% reduction in 
poverty in Africa, more than the 5% reduction estimated for Asia. Growth in manufacturing and 
services has no such effect. The 2008 World Development Report compiles the evidence as follows:
Among 42 developing countries over 1981–2003, 1 percent GDP growth originating in 
agriculture increased the expenditures of the three poorest deciles at least 2.5 times as 
much as growth originating in the rest of the economy …. 
Similarly, Bravo-Ortega and Lederman (2005) find that an increase in overall GDP coming 
from agricultural labor productivity is on average 2.9 times more effective in raising the 
incomes of the poorest quintile in developing countries … than an equivalent increase in 
GDP coming from non-agricultural labor productivity ... 
Using cross-country regressions per region and looking at $2-a-day poverty, Hasan and 
Quibriam (2004) find larger effects from agricultural growth on poverty reduction in Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia, but larger poverty-reducing effects of growth originating 
in other sectors in East Asia and Latin America.
[World Bank 2007, Box 1.2]
It is not hard intuitively to explain why smallholder development, that probably sees immediate 
benefits to a few small farmers, has such an effect on poverty. Farming in Africa is generally intensive 
in labour, and especially so on small farms. When small farmers expand production they invariably 
have to hire in more labour and thus demand for rural labour rises to the benefit of land-poor neigh-
bours who need additional work off their small plots. It is plausible, too, that supply of labour falls 
as some of the small farmers, with enhanced farm incomes, withdraw from occasional labouring. 
Then there are links from farming to the rural non-farm economy. More output means more jobs 
in supplying inputs, processing, and transport. Even more important, small farmers tend to spend 
much of their additional income locally on construction, services, and local manufactures such as 
furniture; so that links through consumption can be strong. 
Formal modelling of such rural linkages in Africa have produced estimates of 1.35 for rural Sierra 
Leone in 1974–75 (Haggblade, Hammer & Hazell 1991) to estimates ranging from 1.31 to an ex-
traordinary 4.62 for Burkina, Niger, Senegal and Zambia in the 1980s (Delgado et al. 1994, Delgado, 
Hopkins & Kelly 1994) — the very high estimates being explained as the result of isolation in rural 
Africa which means that any exogenous increase in farm earnings will be spent disproportionately 
on locally-produced goods and services.17 
These effects are likely to be strengthened if there are complementary efforts to support the liveli-
hoods of those with very small farms for whom a more commercialised small farming will not be a 
17 The multipliers for rural Africa reported by Delgado and colleagues have been criticised by de Janvry (1994) as being 
based on unlikely assumptions about the perfect elasticity of supply of non-tradables.
FAC Working PAPer · No. 08 · 17
FAC Working Paper
route out of poverty. Dorward (2009) presents a simple scheme to link such differences to policy 
implications, consisting of three options:
Stepping up•	 : intensify farming through improving transport, facilitating access to inputs and 
credit, investing in technology and through farmer organisation
Stepping out•	  into the non-farm economy by more education and skills, better health care, 
and providing potential migrants with information on opportunities, conferring on them 
transferable rights as citizens and facilitating remittances; and,
Hanging in•	 , providing social protection for those who have few assets and options, investing 
in technology for food staples to allow them to make best use of their small plots, and making 
sure that the next generation get a better start than their parents through primary health 
care, infant nutrition, and schooling.   
The beauty of this formulation is that it sets several current debates in context. Yes, conventional 
agricultural development is needed for some farmers; but not for all: the technology of food sta-
ples for the very poor and near-landless may need to be different to that provided to small farmers 
with more potential, stressing innovations that save labour and use external inputs sparingly. The 
rural non-farm economy can be seen as complementary to agricultural development, rather than 
an alternative.18  Social protection is an important way to deal with chronic poverty, but not the 
only measure. Finally, rural development matters, but it is not exclusive of urban development: rural 
areas and urban centres are linked so that demand from urban areas for agricultural produce, supply 
of inputs for farmers from industries based in cities, and opportunities for households to diversify by 
migrating to urban areas are all potential ways forward. 
Finally, will smallholder development deliver food security? It will help: more food availability is likely 
to tend to push down food prices, while increased incomes for the poor are likely to mean greater 
access to food. But this will not be sufficient. A substantial part of the problem of child malnutrition 
in areas such as West Africa comes from disease, not food supply. For better nutrition, the continent 
needs to do as much to ensure access to clean water, sanitation, and primary health measures, as to 
grow more food — see Wiggins & Keats (2009) for a review.
18 The debate that poses the non-farm rural to the agricultural economy is somewhat sterile: most of the spending 
and policy that supports agriculture — rural roads, education, health care, power supplies — also supports the rural non-farm 
economy. The main element of trade-off concerns spending on agricultural research, and here the good news is that a small 
investment goes a very long way, so it is not necessary to commit major parts of the public budget to support farming alone.
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Annex A: 
Evidence of the inverse ratio of farm size to 
production per hectare in Africa 
A1: Kenya: smallholder areas, 1974/75: value of output by farm size
Sources: Dorling 1979, Tidrick 1979, quoted in Hunt 1984 (Tables 9.4 & 9.5)
A2: Lafia, Plateau State, Nigeria, 1982/84
Source: APMEPU, in Eyoh 1990, 1992
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